Abstract We-thinking theories allow groups to deliberate as agents. They have been introduced into the economic domain for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Among the few scholars who have proposed formal approaches to illustrate how we-thinking arises, Bacharach offers one of the most developed theories from the game theoretic point of view. He presents a number of intuitions, not always mutually consistent and not fully developed. In this article, I propose a way to complete Bacharach's theory, generalizing the interdependence hypothesis and building on his intuition about vacillation. It is a simple model of vacillation between the I and we-modes of reasoning, as a way in which we-thinking can come to mind in the face of a decision problem. The vacillation model makes we-reasoning more easily usable in game theory.
Introduction
The idea of team-thinking or we-thinking is increasingly drawing the attention of scholars. In its general formulation, it has been proposed by Hodgson (1967) , Regan (1980) , Gilbert (1989) , Hurley (1989 ), Tuomela (1995 , 2007 , and Hollis (1998) . Within this body of literature, Sugden (1993 Sugden ( , 2000 Sugden ( , 2003 and Bacharach (1995 Bacharach ( , 1997 Bacharach ( , 1999 Bacharach ( , 2006 1 have developed analytical frameworks from an economic point of view. We-thinking theories allow groups to deliberate as agents. A central concept in these theories is what has been called team reasoning:
Roughly, somebody 'team-reasons' if she works out the best feasible combination of actions for all the members of her team, then does her part in it' (Bacharach 2006, p. 121 ).
In other words, when people we-reason they seek an answer to the question: 'What should we do?', and they act accordingly.
The main claim of scholars who analyze we-thinking is that it is a coherent mode of reasoning people may use when they face a decision problem of a certain type.
We-thinking theories have been introduced into the economic domain for both theoretical and empirical reasons.
First of all, we-thinking theories account for the relational nature of humankind (see Sugden 2005; Bruni 2008; Davis 2009). As Hollis puts it: 'we need a more social conception of what persons are and a role-related account of the obligations which make the social world go round and express our humanity' (Hollis 1998, p. 104).
Secondly, team reasoning helps to solve some puzzles that arise in game theory, especially linked to Hi-Lo 2 and one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games, in which rational choice theory cannot explain selection of the Pareto-superior equilibria or cooperation. 3 We thinking is also a way to explain how people can coordinate on 'focal point' equilibria: focal points have been introduced by Schelling (1960), they are particular Nash Equilibria on which the players' expectations converge. Team reasoning offers an explanation of coordination on focal points, which has been tested by Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) , Barsdley et al. (2006), and Crawford et al. (2008) .
Finally, team reasoning can also explain experimental and empirical evidence on how people behave in other games and decision contexts. Experimental evidence shows that, especially in some kinds of games, people do endorse we-thinking. 4 In particular Colman et al. (2008) , making use of likelife vignettes and abstract games, show evidence for team reasoning, as a good predictor of strategy choices.
